Why you should still care about Russia

Most Americans assume, when discussing international politics, that the United States is the world’s only hegemony. American economic prowess and military might are strong indicators that substantiate such an assumption. But perhaps more convincingly, the U.S. is the world’s sole hegemony because no alternatives exist. Who is America really competing with in 2010?

While some are quick to draw attention to an emergent China, it’s unlikely that such a nation would actively engage the United States in a battle for political primacy outside its borders, inclusive of Taiwan or not. Iran may pose a nuclear threat to the international community, but it has shown no indication that it plans to pursue global dominance through ideological expansion or the acquisition of land. Non-state actors like terrorist groups may be top threats to nations like the U.S. but have acquired no international traction outside their spheres of influence. The last standing contender for power—the nation that fought the U.S. across four continents for the bulk of the 20th century—has effectively been buried and forgotten. Russia is long gone.

Or is it? The elaborately orchestrated April 8 signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by presidents Medvedev and Obama would certainly lead one to believe that Russia is a nonexistent threat to the U.S. The Prague renewal of START reaffirmed a joint U.S.-Russian commitment to end nuclear arms by cutting deployed nuclear weaponry by a third. Furthermore, New START acts as a testament to the “reset” diplomacy of the Obama administration aimed at ameliorating ties with Russia broken during the summer 2008 clash between Russia and its U.S.-backed neighbor, Georgia.

But this, I would argue, is all a façade. While the START agreement was indeed remarkable, it incorrectly overshadows a series of developments carried out by Russia against the United States. We, the American public, are quick to commend Russia when it works with the U.S. but prefer to shun Russian acts that are in direct opposition to U.S. foreign policy. An entrenched history of the Cold War in the American psyche prompts us to naturally assume that all Soviet-American ill will has dissipated, that all is good between the United States and Russia. Memories of Cold War casualties, bomb threats, and the possibility of complete extermination by nuclear weapons are especially poignant in the wake of two U.S. armed engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. The last thing Americans want to worry about is a resurrected Russia.

However, such ill will does exist and is characterized by popular resistance to American encroachment in Europe and Central Asia. Three recent events best demonstrate why we must directly deal with and care more about Russia: 1) the success of a pro-Moscow candidate in February Ukrainian presidential elections, 2) revolutionary tides in Kyrgyzstan at the hands of a pro-Moscow, socialist opposition party, and 3) the complete obliteration of the pro-Washington Polish executive (albeit by the doing of nature).

The significance of the victory of Ukrainian candidate Viktor Yanukovich and the resurgence of Russia across Europe and Asia lies in the fact that both occurred via popular support. This is precisely why Russia is a hegemonic risk to the United States. Establishing hegemony is not just about exhibiting brute military strength—it’s about persuading, motivating, and expanding one’s reach over hearts and minds. Ukrainians were fed up with their 15 percent GDP loss following the global economic crisis, and viewed their pro-Western government as incapable of handling their bread and butter issues. Pro-Russian alignment therefore became widely attractive by comparison.

The extent of Russian involvement in last week’s Kyrgyz unrest is only beginning to unfold. Recent news reports state that the Russian media actively worked to criticize Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s government in the weeks leading up to the outburst of opposition riots and protests. While Russian Prime Minister Putin has supported Kyrgyz popular discontent against Bakiyev’s corruption, morals and corruption have little to do with Russian interests in Kyrgyzstan—it’s all strategic for Russia. Russian opposition to Bakiyev and support for the resistance movements only began after Bakiyev reneged on a deal to close an American military base at Manas. Russia retaliated on Bakiyev’s deal-breaking by slapping tariffs on Kyrgyz commodities, slashing natural resource subsidies to Kyrgyzstan, and supporting the forced removal of Bakiyev and his cronies.

To attempt to bring my argument full circle, I’ll leave you with a conspiratorial-esque note on the most recent Polish plane crash disaster. The major point of contention between Russia and the United States that stalled the signing of New START was the ballistic missile shield the U.S. hopes to construct in Eastern Europe. The Russians vehemently oppose a shield that they believe will be pointed at them. During New START negotiations, Russia failed to convince the U.S. to abrogate this defense plan. It’s worth mentioning that the fallen Polish president Lech Kaczynski approved the construction of the US defense shield within his nation, and that his fellow passengers aboard the crashed plane were of the most vocal supporters of an augmented U.S. presence in formerly Soviet Europe and Asia.

I don’t mean to say that Russia plotted the Polish crash or that the Russians are scheming for a new Cold War. Rather, I simply urge you to rethink, examine, and scrutinize Russian politics. We can take political developments at face value and assume the best or effectively analyze them, preparing ourselves for the worst.

Rhonda Shafei is a Columbia College sophomore. She is the publisher of the Columbia Political Union and the director-general of CMUNCE. The Politics of Hummus runs alternate Thursdays.